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Introduction
Over the past 50 years there has been a gradual
introduction into various jurisdictions globally of laws
on “unexplained wealth”, which have often been
controversial as they have provided for civil forfeiture of
assets (without the traditional safeguards of a criminal
trial) as a means of curbing criminal activity. Separately,
and as a result of the increase in match-fixing (or its
variant spot-fixing) in different sports, many countries
have passed new laws making betting-related cheating at
sport (i.e. fixing) a criminal offence. This article looks at
the potential for combating fixing-related corruption in
sport through: (i) the introduction of new rules into
sporting bodies’ Codes of Conduct for athletes in relation
to unexplained wealth; and (ii) the use of civil forfeiture
orders.
The growth in betting-related fixing in
sport; calls for newmeasures to combat
corruption and the growing role of law
enforcement agencies
Gambling on sport has grown exponentially in recent
years and with this growth has come an increase in
betting-related corruption, now recognised as a serious
threat to professional sport’s continuing popularity and
commerciality.1 Athletes have been tempted to take
financial reward from gambling syndicates in return for
“fixing” either the result of a match (match-fixing), or an
incident within amatch (so-called spot fixing, for example
the timing of the first corner in a football match or how
many runs will be conceded in one over of a cricket
match). Jacques Rogge, President of the International
Olympic Committee, and one of the most powerful men
in sport, issued a stark warning in 2011 that fixing is as
much a danger to the health of competitive sport as illegal
drug use, describing it as “potentially crippling” and a
“cancer” with links to “mafia” organisations.2 Michel
Platini, President of UEFA, has called match-fixing “the
biggest threat facing the future of sport in Europe”.3
The fixing crisis facing a range of different sports,
rather than abating continues to grow. A police
investigation intomatch-fixing in top flight Italian football
led to arrests of players and managers weeks before the
start of the 2012 Summer European Football
Championship entailing changes to Italy’s national squad
and a call from Italian Premier, Mario Monti, to suspend
all football in Italy for two years.4 More recently still,
players have received bans for fixing in cricket’s Indian
Premier League 2012 Season.5
Evidence is emerging that much of the rise in
match-fixing is fuelled by criminal gangs against whom
individual sports governing bodies are relatively
powerless. Sports governing bodies are therefore turning
to law enforcement agencies to help in the fight against
fixing. In May 2012, at the FIFA Congress in Budapest,
INTERPOLSecretary-General, RonaldK. Noble, referred
to the match-fixing crisis being the “result of transnational
organised crime’s global reach”.6FIFA has entered into
partnership with INTERPOL which in 2011 set up a
dedicated Integrity in Sport unit based at the INTERPOL
General Secretariat headquarters in Lyon, France7 as part
of a ten-year planned partnership between FIFA and
INTERPOL in which FIFA has pledged to spend £17.5
million to clamp down onmatch-fixing and illegal betting.
Cricket has suffered arguablymore than any other sport
in adverse headlines concerning cheating through fixing.
In 2011, three Pakistani cricketers were sent to prison in
the United Kingdom for having fixed elements of an
international TestMatch in August 2010 between Pakistan
and England. This was not an isolated incident, as in the
previous two decades several international cricketers had
received bans for involvement in betting-related
corruption, including life bans for the captains of two of
the strongest teams in world cricket, South Africa (Hanse
Cronje) and India (Mohammed Azarudhin).
The global emergence of laws providing
for civil forfeiture or “unexplained
wealth” orders to combat crime
In 2012, respected figures within the world of sport have
called for the use of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs)
to combat fixing-related corruption in sport. UWOs are
1 See K. Carpenter, “Match-fixing—The Biggest Threat to Sport in the 21st Century” [2012] I.S.L.R. 2 and also T. Serby “xxx” [2012] I.S.L.J. 1 for a summary of recent
fixing incidents and the legal issues.
2 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk January 27, 2011 [Accessed August 26, 2012].
3 See http://www.dailymail.co.uk September 28, 2011 [Accessed August 26, 2012].
4As reported in the Irish Independent (May 30, 2012), see http://www.independent.ie [Accessed June 2, 2012].
5As reported by the BBC (May 15, 2012), see http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport [Accessed May 15, 2012].
6 See http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/Speeches [Accessed October 9, 2012].
7 See http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Corruption/Integrity-in-Sport [Accessed May 17, 2012].
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court orders forfeiting wealth which has been adjudged
to represent the proceeds of criminal activity. Prior to the
controversial emergence of civil forfeiture orders,
forfeiture of assets after conviction on a criminal charge
after a criminal trial has been an uncontroversial feature
of legal systems throughout the world. Also relatively
uncontroversial have been the forfeiture laws targeted
specifically at public officials. Several jurisdictions have
made it an offence for public officials to acquire
unexplained wealth (e.g. Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China, Argentina, Botswana,
Ecuador, El Salvador, India, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela
and Zambia). Article 20 of the United Nations Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC) which criminalises illicit
enrichment of public officials defines the offence as “a
significant increase in the assets of a public official that
he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or
her lawful income”.
In the last 50 years the countries which have introduced
civil forfeiture UWO laws, include the United States with
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act
1970 (RICO), South Africa (Prevention of Organised
CrimeAct 1998), theUnitedKingdom (Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002, hereafter POCA 2002), Ireland (Prevention of
CrimeAct 1996) andAustralia (Criminal Assets Recovery
Act 1990 of New SouthWales and subsequent legislation
in other states as well as the federal law referred to above,
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002). This gradual global spread
of civil forfeiture laws based on UWOs has been a
reaction to the rise of organised criminal gangs that have
been able to hide their criminal acts and the proceeds of
crime from the eyes of the prosecuting authorities, thereby
making criminal prosecution of them more difficult.
UWOs through civil forfeiture remain controversial,
in essence because they involve a sanction for a criminal
act without any of the safeguards provided by a criminal
trial, namely the presumption of innocence. Godinho has
observed that civil forfeiture is largely confined to
common law systems and is generally unknown to civil
law jurisdictions.8 As Young points out,9 this lack of
universality explains the ambivalence of international
treaties on organised crime that fall short of saying how
states should arrange for forfeiture whether through
criminal or civil procedures. Article 77(2)(b) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court only provides
for forfeiture after a person has been convicted of a crime
(referred to in art.5 of the Statute).
The term “unexplained wealth” derives from laws on
civil forfeiture in Asia and Australia. Rather than the
nomenclature “unexplained wealth” the legislation in the
United Kingdom, Ireland and South Africa refers instead
to the “proceeds of crime”.
How effective have civil forfeiture UWOs been? The
picture is varied. A report dated 2011 and funded by the
US Department of Justice by Booz, Allen and Hamilton10
concludes that from 1998–2012 the Irish Criminal Asset
Bureau recovered nearly US$160 million in forfeiture
orders and taxation orders on the proceeds of crime.11
Conversely, in England, during the first three years of its
existence the Assets Recovery Agency set up under
POCA 2002 cost over £60 million and managed to
retrieve £6 million, according to a damning report
published in February 2007 by the National Audit Office.
In Australia, recovery under UWOs has been hampered
by the fact that gambling and inheritance gains do not
have to be declared for tax, making it difficult for the
authorities to rebut the claims made by defendants that
their wealth has accrued though these means.12
Unexplained wealth orders: a solution
to the fixing crisis in professional
sports?
The International Cricket Council (ICC), the international
governing body of cricket, is acknowledged as having
taken a lead in fighting corruption and it commissioned
Bertrand de Speville, a former Solicitor-General of Hong
Kong, to report into how best cricket could fight back
against corrupt betting-related fixing in the sport. The
final de Speville Report,13 published in January 2012,
included amongst other recommendations the following
draft provision for inclusion into the relevant codes of
conduct which cricketers and officials participating in
ICC endorsed events are governed by:
“(1) Any person to whom any of the ICC codes
of conduct applies … who—
(a) has a standard of living
incommensurate with his present
or past official emoluments; or
(b) is in control of wealth
disproportionate to his present or
past official emoluments, is in
breach of this code unless he gives
to [a tribunal established by the
ICCCode of Conduct Commission
for the purpose] a satisfactory
explanation of how he is able to
have such a standard of living or
how such wealth came under his
control.”
Another respected bodywithin cricket, theMarylebone
Cricket Club’s World Cricket Committee (a committee
set up by the MCC, guardian of cricket’s laws), has also
recommended the use of “unexplained wealth laws” to
8 J. Godinho, “Civil Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime: A View from Macau”, in S. Young (ed.), Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property (Edward Elgar, 2009), Ch.11.
9Young, Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property, p.2.
10 In October 2011 a report into UWOs by Booz, Allen and Hamilton funded by the US Department of Justice was published and is available at https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237163.pdf [Accessed May 17, 2012]. The report reviews the recent global growth of Unexplained Wealth Order laws and recent developments in
confiscation and forfeiture jurisprudence. The report focuses in particular on the effectiveness of UWOs in Ireland and Australia.
11Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Report into UWOs, pp.2 and 134.
12Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Report into UWOs, p.2.
13 See http://static.icc-cricket.com/ugc/documents/DOC_704 [Accessed May 17, 2012], p.8 and Annex 5.
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combat corruption in the sport. This committee,
comprising a group of highly respected former players
chaired by former England captain, Mike Brearley, and
whose anti-corruption working party was led by former
Australian captain, Steve Waugh, reported to the ICC’s
Anti-corruption and security unit in February 2012 with
its recommendations for curbing corruption in the sport.
Steve Waugh, who was instrumental in producing the
report, said: “cricket’s administrators need to be bold in
their actions and cannot be complacent in the fight against
corruption”. One of the recommendations made in the
committee’s report was that “relevant authorities should
explore any unexplained wealth of suspected players and
each governing body should hold a gift register for its
players”.14
The ICC’s official response to de Speville’s
recommendation to introduce “unexplained wealth”
sanctions into the ICC’s codes was lukewarm
“to attempt to try and implement such a system to
international players and support personnel from
different jurisdictions, whose assets may have been
transferred into further jurisdictions, who are at
different stages in their careers, who have many
different sources of income, and which is likely to
require the cooperation of governments and/or
financial institutions, is likely to be very difficult
indeed, not to mention hugely burdensome on the
players and extremely difficult to administer.
Nevertheless, the ICC understands and accepts the
rationale behind the recommendation and will
consider it further with its wider group of
stakeholders.”15
Both the Code of Conduct for Players and Player
support personnel (ICCCode of Conduct) and the separate
Anti-Corruption Code for Players and Player Support
Personnel (the Anti-Corruption Code)16 have been updated
in the light of the match-fixing crisis that threatens the
integrity of the sport. These codes govern all cricketers
playing in any ICC-endorsed event, which comprises all
international cricket matches. By way of introduction to
the ICCAnti-Corruption Code, art.1.1.3 states “advancing
technology and increasing popularity have led to a
substantial increase in the amount, and the sophistication,
of betting on cricket matches”. The article refers to the
development of new betting products such as spread
betting and internet betting, which allow betting from any
time or place including once a game has commenced that
“have all increased the potential for the development
of corrupt betting practices. Even where that risk is
more theoretical than practical, its consequence is
to create a perception that the integrity of the sport
is under threat … it is of the nature of this type of
misconduct that it is carried out under cover and in
secret, thereby creating significant challenges for
the ICC in the enforcement of rules of conduct.”
Article 1.3 imposes on players a requirement to confirm
that they consent to the “collection, processing, disclosure
and use of [personal] information relating to him/herself
and his/her activities”, and obliges players to submit to
the exclusive jurisdiction of any Anti-Corruption Tribunal
convened under the Anti-Corruption Code, and to the
exclusive jurisdiction of any Court of Arbitration for
Sport panel on any appeal. The substantive offences in
relation to fixing in the Anti-Corruption Code are set out
at art.2 and cover “fixing or contriving in any way” any
aspect of an ICC Event (art.2.1.1) and “ensuring the
occurrence of a particular incident” for reward, which to
the player’s knowledge is the subject of a bet. Other
offences include not reporting to the ICC’s Anti
Corruption and Security Unit any knowledge of an
offence.
Article 3.1 states that the burden of proof for proving
conduct offences is on a sliding scale “up to proof beyond
reasonable doubt (for the most serious offences)”.
However, the proposed recommendation by de Speville
on unexplained wealth would, in the case of a UWO,
reverse this burden of proof, i.e. the offence is presumed
where a player is in possession of wealth incommensurate
with their official earnings, and the onus is on the player
to prove the legality of such wealth. What is envisaged
by the de Speville proposal (and more indirectly by the
MCC proposal) is the application of sanctions (banning
an individual from partaking in any matches, thereby
affecting their right to earn a living as a professional
sportsman) on a “reversed burden of proof”.
Article 3.2 of the Code states that “the Anti-Corruption
Tribunal shall not be bound by judicial rules governing
the admissibility of evidence”. How susceptible to legal
challenge would a reversed burden of proof be? Under
art.6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights
there is the right to a “presumption of innocence” when
an individual is accused of a criminal offence. Where the
burden of proof is reversed, there is a presumption of
criminality simply on the basis that there is unexplained
wealth. As Wilsher commented in 2006,17 in the context
of the offence of illicit enrichment for public officials,
the rights of the accused are infringed since no criminal
act needs to be proved and the ingredients, namely being
a public official and having excessive wealth, do not in
themselves constitute criminal activity.
However, the presumption of innocence is not absolute,
and interference with it, through a reversed evidential
burden of proof, may be legitimate. The European Court
14See Report of the MCC World Cricket Committee to ICC’s ACSU, submitted February 20, 2012, http://www.lords.org/data/files/mcc-world-cricket-committee-corruption
-report-10770.pdf [Accessed May 27, 2012], p.7.
15As reported in The Hindu, see http://www.thehindu.com/sport/cricket/article2851492.ece [Accessed May 17, 2012].
16The ICC Anti-Corruption Code for Players and Player Support Personnel is available at http://www.icc-cricket.com/anti_corruption/useful_documents.php [Accessed
December 14, 2012].
17D. Wilsher, “Inexplicable Wealth and Illicit Enrichment of Public Officials: A Model Draft that Respects Human Rights in Corruption Cases” (2006) 45 Crime, Law and
Social Change 27.
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of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Salabiaku v France18
considered the question of whether a presumption of
liability is compatible with the presumption of innocence
in the context of punishment for a crime. In that case the
defendant was convicted of a criminal offence upon being
found with cannabis in his suitcase, and he argued
unsuccessfully all the way up to the ECtHR that the
authorities should bear the burden of proving criminal
intent (as opposed to, say, negligence). The ECtHR held:
“Presumptions of fact or law operate in every legal
system. Clearly, the convention does not prohibit
such presumptions in principle. It does, however,
require the contracting states to remain within certain
limits in this respect as regards criminal law …
[art.6(2)] requires states to confine [presumptions]
within reasonable limits which take into account the
importance of what is at stake andmaintain the rights
of the defence.”
As de Speville19 himself put it in 1997 commenting on
a Privy Council decision on an appeal from Hong Kong
in a case concerning illicit enrichment of a public official
and the defence of the presumption of innocence
enshrined in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights:
“In summary, the right to a fair trial and the right to
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law require that the onus of proof must fall upon
the prosecution, but may be transferred to the
accused when he is seeking to establish a defence.”20
The alternative to the in personammeasure of banning
an athlete pursuant to an UWO sanction in the Code of
Conduct of an individual sport is the in rem sanction of
forfeiting unexplained wealth/the proceeds of crime
through a civil forfeiture action. The lawfulness of the
civil forfeiture regime has recently been tested in the
highest civil court in the United Kingdom, the Supreme
Court.
The UK law on unexplained wealth:
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; Gale v
Serious Organised Crime Agency
The recent case involving the Serious Organised Crime
Agency (SOCA), Gale v Serious Organised Crime
Agency,21 was the first time that the Supreme Court
considered unexplained wealth and the tensions between
fundamental human rights to a fair trial and the burden
of proof contained within civil forfeiture laws. Gale was
decided on the basis of POCA 2002, which introduced
civil forfeiture in its present form into English law.
Potentially SOCA (through POCA 2002) could play
an important role in fighting the fixing epidemic in sport.
SOCA is the government agency responsible for fraud
detection and prevention in the United Kingdom; it is a
Home Office Non-Departmental Public Body created by
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 and is
the UKNational Central Bureau for INTERPOL. SOCA’s
functions in relation to civil recovery/forfeiture functions
are set out in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the
Serious Crime Act 2007. SOCA’s Annual Plan 2011/12
whose foreword is by Home Secretary, Theresa May,
describes how during 2011/12 SOCA employed in the
region of 3,700 full-time equivalent staff operating from
around 40 sites in the United Kingdom and overseas
locations. The Home Secretary’s priorities include “fraud
against individuals and the private sector …”. The UK
Gambling Commission reports that there has already been
a confiscation order (for £30,000) achieved under POCA
2002 for corrupt sports betting practices.22
POCA 2002 is based on, and very much typical of,
other jurisdictions’ existing laws on civil forfeiture. As
Leong comments
“during the establishment of the civil recovery
regime in the UK, experience was drawn fromRICO
in the US, the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990
in NSW [the Australian state of New South Wales],
the Proceeds Of Crime Act 1996 and Criminal
Assets BureauAct 1996 in the Republic of Ireland”.23
Although the concept of forfeiture under English law
dates back to mediaeval times, the Forfeiture Act 1870
abolished automatic forfeiture to the Crown of a convicted
felon’s property. In the United Kingdom the first modern
Act of Parliament, prior to POCA 2002, allowing for the
state to divest criminals of the proceeds of their crime
was the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. This law
was introduced after the police successfully tracked down
a gang of drug traffickers (Operation Julie) but there was
no basis on which to confiscate the proceeds of their
crimes. In fact, the House of Lords had ruled that
£750,000 had to be returned to the convicted drug dealers.
The Criminal Justice Act 1988 then extended the powers
of confiscation to crimes other than drug dealing and in
2002, with the introduction of POCA 2002, a full civil
recovery procedure of criminally acquired proceeds of
crime was introduced.
POCA 2002, as amended by the Serious Organised
Crime and Police Act 2005, allows for recovery of the
profits of crime through either the civil or criminal courts
as it provides for three distinct means of attacking the
assets of someone who has been held to be in possession
of the proceeds of crime. First, confiscation orders may
be ordered in Crown Court (criminal) proceedings at the
18 Salabiaku v France [1988] 13 E.H.R.R. 379.
19B. de Speville, “Reversing the Onus of Proof: Is it Compatible with Respect for Human Rights Norms? Paper presented at eighth International Anti-Corruption Conference,
Lima (September 7–11, 1997), http://8iacc.org/papers/despeville.html [Accessed June 27, 2012].
20Attorney General v Hui Kin-hong [1995] 1 HKCLR; Attorney General v Hui Kin Hong CA No.52 of 1995 at 7 and 8.
21 Serious Organised Crime Agency v Gale v Gale [2011] UKSC 49; [2012] H.R.L.R. 5.
22 See http://gamblingcommission.go.uk/PDF/AnnualReport [Accessed November 10, 2011].
23A. Leong, “Assets Recovery Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: The UK Experience”, in Young, Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property, Ch.7.
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request of the prosecutor upon conviction, although the
amount confiscated does not have to represent the actual
proceeds of crime; and secondly, under POCA 2002 Pt
6, unlawfully obtained wealth may be taxed. When the
three Pakistani cricketers were convicted in 2011 of the
fixing charge in relation to the Lord’s Test Match in 2010,
as well as prison sentences they also received confiscation
orders.
The third possibility, the making of a civil order
forfeiting unexplained wealth acquired through unlawful
activity is provided for under Pt 5 of POCA 2002. Under
Pt 5 the actual proceeds of crime can be tracked down,
whether in the hands of the criminal or a party who has
received them, by SOCA (whose name changes to the
National Crime Agency in 2013).
Civil forfeiture proceedings under POCA 2002 Pt 5 do
not depend on there being a criminal conviction, and the
proceedings are taken in the civil, not criminal, courts.
Section 241 of POCA 2002 allows the civil court to order
recovery of the proceeds of crime further to a request by
SOCA where it is satisfied that the alleged unlawful
conduct occurred on the civil standard, i.e. the balance
of probabilities. Unlawful conduct is defined at s.241 as
“unlawful under the criminal law” and includes conduct
abroad which is unlawful under the criminal law of the
relevant country. In the United Kingdom the Gambling
Act 2005 s.42 created an offence of cheating at gambling,
which the three Pakistani cricketers imprisoned in 2011
for fixing elements of an internationalmatchwere charged
with.
The civil forfeiture provisions under POCA 2002 Pt 5
were designed to target criminals who, owing to the nature
of their crimes, were difficult to convict on the criminal
burden of proof. Short of the type of successful
journalistic “sting” operation that led to the criminal
conviction in 2011 of the three Pakistani cricketers
referred to above, it is extraordinarily difficult to prove
“beyond reasonable doubt” that an athlete has deliberately
underperformed further to an agreement with a
bookmaker.
The Explanatory Notes to Pt 5 (at para.290) clearly
state the underlying intention of the civil forfeiture powers
under POCA 2002, namely to allow for civil recovery of
unexplained wealth representing the proceeds of crime
where the evidence will not allow for a successful
conviction in the criminal courts (where a higher burden
of proof is required)
“… civil recovery … proceedings may be brought
whether or not [criminal] proceedings have been
brought for an offence in connection with the
property. Cases where criminal proceedings have
not been brought would include cases where there
are insufficient grounds for prosecution, or where
the person suspected of the offence is outside the
jurisdiction or has died. Cases where criminal
proceedings have been brought may include cases
where a defendant has been acquitted, or where a
conviction did not result in a confiscation order.”
Initially a non-ministerial government department, the
Assets Recovery Agency (ARA), was constituted under
POCA 2002 to institute forfeiture actions. This was later
merged with the Serious Organised CrimeAgency which
shortly will become the National Crime Agency.
With regard to the relationship between criminal
proceedings and civil forfeiture orders arising from the
same facts, Lord Goldsmith, speaking for the government
in the House of Lords debate on POCA 2002, said on
May 13, 2002:
“We certainly do not accept that, where a criminal
case has not resulted in a conviction, civil recovery
action should automatically be barred. I do not shrink
from the fact that… evidence is available in the civil
process which would satisfy a court, even though it
did not satisfy the criminal process.”
As Lord Goldsmith’s words show, it was clearly the
intention of the government that the purpose of the Act
was to allow for punishment of criminals where there was
insufficient evidence to convict (in the criminal courts)
of a crime. The difficulty in obtaining evidence of
match-fixing has meant that there have been
(internationally) very few instances of charging
match-fixers under the criminal law; and yet match-fixing
is widespread and the guilty athletes who have means
beyond anything legitimately earned through sporting
endeavour remain unpunished. This is what has led to
calls for the use of laws allowing for the recovery of
unexplained wealth.
Must there be evidence of a specific crime before a
forfeiture order can be made under POCA 2002 Pt 5?
Can a case be brought simply where the respondent
appears to have means that exceed the documented
earnings from his lawful trade or profession, as provided
for in the “reversed burden of proof” provision in the
draft de Speville code? It was held in ARA v Green24 that:
(1) the Director of ARA need not allege commission of
a specific criminal offence but must set out matters
alleged to constitute the particular kind of unlawful
conduct by which property was retained; and (2) a claim
for civil recovery cannot be sustained solely upon the
basis that the respondent has no identifiable lawful income
to warrant his lifestyle. To mount a successful civil
forfeiture claim for fixing under Pt 5 of POCA 2002,
there would therefore need to be some evidence of
wrongdoing by an athlete under criminal laws such as the
UK Gambling Act 2005; the evidence might consist of
known connections with gambling syndicates. But
because the proceedings are civil in nature and are not
designed as an in personam punishment for a criminal
act, the evidence has only to point to wrongdoing on the
balance of probabilities, rather than the more rigorous
“beyond reasonable doubt” test in criminal trials.
24Director of Assets Recovery Agency v Green [2005] EWHC 3168 (Admin) at [47].
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POCA 2002 also provides for a procedure to assist in
the difficult task of compiling the evidence necessary to
bring a civil recovery action. Section 246 enables the
enforcement authority to apply without notice, before or
after starting proceedings, for an interim receiving order
to detain recoverable (or associated) property in the hands
of an interim receiver. Leong has described an interim
receiving order as
“a type of worldwide freezing injunction prohibiting
the person to whose property the order applies from
dealing with the property, and also requiring him to
repatriate property or documents abroad to the
UK”.25
Dayman describes the interim receiver’s investigative
functions on behalf of the court as “more akin to the
function of a reporting judge in civil law jurisdictions”.26
Under s.288 the interim receiver is allowed to examine
financial transactions and records over a period of 12
years. The interim receiver’s role has been summarised
by the High Court as “a court appointed expert to
investigate the origin and owner of assets and to report
to the court on those assets”.27
Gale: the facts
The background to the appeal brought by David Gale and
his former wife Teresa before the Supreme Court in 2011
was that they had been investigated in the 1990s in Spain,
Portugal and the United Kingdom on suspicion of the
criminal offences of money laundering, tax evasion and
drug trafficking, but there had not been any successful
convictions. Mr Gale was in fact acquitted of drug
trafficking in Portugal, and proceedings in Spain for the
same offence were discontinued after becoming time
barred. No criminal charges were brought in England;
instead, a civil forfeiture claim was brought against the
Gales in England under POCA 2002 Pt 5; at the outset
of those proceedings the court appointed a receiver to
investigate and take control of the Gales’ assets and
financial records. At the conclusion of the High Court
proceedings, in making a civil forfeiture order it was
evident that the judge, Williams J, relied very much on
the evidence contained in the receiver’s report, which in
turn relied on the evidence before the Portuguese court
which had earlier acquitted Mr Gale of the criminal
charges against him. The receiver concluded that there
was no evidence to back up the Gales’ assertion that their
wealth accrued from legitimate activities but that there
was evidence of complex financial dealings indicative of
money laundering (a criminal act and therefore “unlawful
conduct” under POCA 2002) and concealment.
The outcome of the High Court proceedings made
under Pt 5 of POCA 2002, unsuccessfully appealed by
the Gales before the Court of Appeal, was that the Gales
were ordered to pay £2 million representing the proceeds
of tax evasion, drug trafficking and money laundering.
The Gales appealed this in the Supreme Court. A second,
and subsidiary, issue appealed by the Gales in the
Supreme Court, was the Court of Appeal’s ruling that the
costs of the receiver (totalling approximately £1 million)
could be included in the costs order made against the
Gales (in civil proceedings in England it is usual for the
court to order the loser to pay the legal costs incurred by
the successful party).
The Gales argued before the Supreme Court that civil
forfeiture orders under Pt 5 of POCA 2002 (i.e. a UWO
using the “balance of probabilities” test) was incompatible
with art.6(2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights to the extent that it allows for the finding of a
criminal act on the civil standard of “the balance of
probabilities”.MrGale argued that because the allegations
made against himwere criminal in nature, then a fair trial,
to which he was entitled under art.6, meant that he should
enjoy the protection of proof to the criminal standard, i.e.
“beyond reasonable doubt”. Lord Philips in the Supreme
Court paraphrased the Gales’ legal submission thus
“the language of section 241(3)… should [be] ‘read
down’ … so as to accord to it the meaning that the
court must decide whether it is proved beyond
reasonable doubt that matters alleged to constitute
unlawful conduct occurred. Alternatively, they
submit that the Court should declare the subsection
to be incompatible with the Convention pursuant to
section 4 of the Human Rights Act.”28
Lord Philips, giving the Supreme Court’s lead
judgment, ruled as follows:
“If confiscation proceedings do not involve a
criminal charge, but are subject to the civil standard
of proof, I see no reason in principle why
confiscation should not be based on evidence that
satisfies the civil standard, notwithstanding that it
has proved insufficiently compelling to found a
conviction on application of the criminal standard.”29
With regard to the issue of whether the civil forfeiture
proceedings were an abuse of process as they questioned
the finding of innocence in the earlier (Portuguese)
criminal trial, Williams J. in the High Court had rejected
Mr Gale’s contention that issue estoppel applied with
regard to the criminal proceedings in the Spanish and
Portuguese courts, “clearly the criminal law principle of
autrefois acquit has no application in civil proceedings”.30
The Supreme Court agreed. Lord Brown commented:
25Leong, “Assets Recovery Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002”, in Young, Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property, Ch.7.
26 S. Dayman, “Is the Patient Expected to Live? UK Civil Forfeiture in Operation”, in Young, Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property, Ch.8, p.229.
27Director of Assets Recovery Agency v Wilson [2007] N.I.Q.B. 49 at [10].
28 Serious Organised Crime Agency v Gale [2011] UKSC 49; [2012] H.R.L.R. 5 at [5].
29 Serious Organised Crime Agency v Gale [2011] UKSC 49; [2012] H.R.L.R. 5 at [44].
30 Serious Organised Crime Agency v Gale [2009] EWHC 1015 (QB) at [18].
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“contrary to widespread popular misconception, acquittal
does not prove the defendant innocent”.31 Lord Philips
remarked: “it is perfectly obvious that failure to establish
guilt according to the required standard does not
demonstrate that the defendant did not commit the
criminal act”.32.
The Supreme Court in Gale has therefore upheld earlier
decisions inWalsh v Director of Assets Recovery Agency
and R. v He & Cheng33 and has dismissed criticisms that
the civil forfeiture proceedings in POCA 2002 Pt 5, in
providing sanctions for criminal behaviour without the
safety net of the presumption of innocence until proven
otherwise “beyond reasonable doubt”, offend against art.6
of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Conclusion
Increasingly, in recent years, not just cricketers, but
athletes from a variety of sports, have undoubtedly
engaged in match-fixing for financial reward. It has in
the main proved beyond the criminal law to charge and
punish the cheats, because of the difficulty of obtaining
sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
criminal acts have been perpetrated, and so they have
gone largely unpunished and they have not been asked
to defend their unexplained wealth. There is a clear
analogy betweenmoney laundering, which the authorities
have attacked through civil forfeiture laws, and
betting-related corruption in sport. Both crimes often
involve organised criminal gangs who can hide the
proceeds of their crime and in both cases insufficient
evidence of the wrongdoing can be obtained to obtain
criminal convictions. Corrupt betting-related fixing in
sport is now threatening to assume epidemic proportions.
Law enforcement agencies from INTERPOL down now
recognise that criminal gangs are often behind the fixing
syndicates. Entrapment has proved the most successful
tactic in procuring proof of the fixers’ guilt (as evidenced
in the sort of journalistic “sting” operation made famous
by The News of the World in the Pakistani cricket case in
2010). But entrapment by investigative journalism cannot
alone rid sport of its growing problem. Recently the UK
Supreme Court has confirmed that UWO civil forfeiture
recovery proceedings, where brought by the Serious
Organised Crime Agency, are not criminal proceedings
in nature designed to penalise any person and therefore
the protections built into criminal proceedings such as
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, do not apply. The prospect of
the SOCA, applying POCA 2002, working with the
English cricket authorities, or the governing body of any
other sport, to investigate Gambling Act 2005 s.42
offences appears a natural extension of INTERPOL’s
involvement with FIFA. Alternatively, sports governing
bodies might prefer to take the law into their own hands
and insert UWO sanctions into their Codes of Conduct
as advocated in the de Speville Report to the ICC.
31 Serious Organised Crime Agency v Gale [2011] UKSC 49; [2012] H.R.L.R. 5 at [115].
32 Serious Organised Crime Agency v Gale [2011] UKSC 49; [2012] H.R.L.R. 5 at [19].
33Walsh v Director of Assets Recovery Agency [2005] NICA 6; R. (on the application of the Director of Assets Recovery Agency) v Jia jin He No.2 [2004] EWHC 3021
(Admin.).
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